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Nuclear Learning in South Asia: The South Asian Experience 
Rabia Akhtar 
 
The South Asian experience of Indian and Pakistani nuclearization and the lessons learnt 
thereafter is different from the Cold War experience of the United States and the Soviet Union. 
While there are some structural similarities that remain the same for all nuclear weapons states, 
there are major differences in terms of how Indian and Pakistani threat perceptions have shaped 
their strategic culture and outlook given their shared past, ideologies, relationships with other 
countries in the international system, and their geographical placement in the regional system. In 
my co-authored monograph with Debak Das on ‘Nuclear Learning in South Asia’, we analyzed 
the lessons learnt by India and Pakistan at the following three levels: the individual, the 
organizational or bureaucratic, and the systemic levels (see figure below).1 
At the Individual level, lessons by India and Pakistan are learned differently given the unique 
nature of the nuclear-decision making/policy elites in each country. In Pakistan, the nuclear 
decision-making elite consists of both politico-military elements, while in India, it is politico-
scientific, with the military playing a minimal role in the decision-making process. Even after 
eighteen years of nuclearization, the nuclear establishment (politico-military/politico-scientific) 
in each country remains unchanged. At the domestic or state level of analysis, nuclear behavior 
is not the result of the state behaving as a unitary actor; rather the type of regime/government, 
organizations, and bureaucracies in each country have influenced, shaped, and defined their 
learning trajectories. Take, for example, the evolution of the ‘deterrence posture’ adopted by 
India and Pakistan over the past eighteen years. Both countries started by adopting ‘credible 
minimum deterrence’ as their defining doctrine, but over a period of years both countries have 
made attempts to modify their deterrence postures, even though each still maintains that its 
posture is ‘minimal’. The level of Indian nuclear modernization in the past couple of years and 
its plans for future modernization reveal that deterrence will be anything but minimal, and it is 
quite possible that in coming years we will see a shift in the Indian strategic lexicon whereby the 
Indian policymakers and scholars will start using ‘credible deterrence’ sans the ‘minimal’. For 
Pakistan however, the shift has already taken place, whereby ‘credible minimum deterrence’ has 
                                                          
1 Rabia Akhtar and Debak Das, “Nuclear Learning in South Asia: The Levels of Analysis,” RCSS Policy Studies 57 
(New Delhi: Manohar) 2015, 38 (pdf). 
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been replaced with ‘full spectrum deterrence’, even though the establishment believes full 
spectrum deterrence to still be credible deterrence at minimal levels. What ‘minimal’ entails, 
however, is unknown for both countries and is open to interpretation. After eighteen years of 
nuclearization, ‘evolution of deterrence’ is a set pattern, one that clearly defines the nuclear 
learning trajectories of both India and Pakistan as they continue to grow as nuclear weapons 
states.2 I would maintain that the path to nuclear modernization has itself been a negative 
outcome, for it entails a forever increasing arms race in the region, but the lessons generated for 
                                                          
2 To understand Pakistan’s nuclearization and deterrence dynamics, please see Gen. Khalid Kidwai’s (former DG 
Strategic Plans Division NCA, Pakistan) interview with Peter Lavoy at the Carnegie Nuclear Policy Conference, 
March 23, 2015, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/03/23/interview-with-khalid-kidwai/i2sx. For an 
understanding of Indian nuclear deterrence, see Shyam Saran’s talk (former Special Envoy for Nuclear Affairs) on 
‘Is India’s Nuclear Deterrent Credible’, at India Habitat Center, New Delhi, April 24, 2013, available at 
http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/files/2013/05/Final-Is-Indias-Nuclear-Deterrent-Credible-rev1-2-1-3.pdf. 
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deterrence and steps taken by both countries for the augmentation and sustainability of 
deterrence credibility are positive. 
 
Systemic Influences on Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Choices 
The first, and perhaps the most important, lesson that the two countries learnt came from their 
observations at the systemic level and how the two nuclear superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union, conducted their affairs. Their outlook stemmed from the international system that took 
shape post-WWII up until the early 1970s, which gave birth to a nuclear order that recognized 
only five nuclear weapons states (NWS), namely, the United States, Russia, UK, France, and 
China, as the only legitimate nuclear powers. The entry to the nuclear club was closed to all 
other countries after the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970. In South Asia, 
India and Pakistan challenged this nuclear order and refused to become part of the non-nuclear 
club or the treaty that refused entry to any future nuclear aspirants. 
 
In their run up to nuclearization, India and Pakistan observed that the inconsistencies of the 
established nuclear order were a sort of ‘organized hypocrisy’ whereby the privileged five 
enjoyed a status no others did in the international system. Both countries believed that nuclear 
weapons were a currency of power, prestige, and security––a negative lesson, perhaps, but a 
lesson nonetheless. The duo learned that deterrence was not just a jazzy concept, but that it 
actually worked and the balance of terror ensured ‘nuclear peace’. To nuclear optimists this 
might appear as a positive lesson, but if you were to ask someone today to make a prediction 
about the next 70 years of nuclear peace, then the answer might not be a resounding yes, which 
in itself is the single most disturbing reality of a world with nine NWS. 
 
The organized hypocrisy of the nuclear non-proliferation regime—whereby, having monopolized 
the global nuclear export control arrangements (Nuclear Suppliers Group et al.), several 
countries controlled who benefitted from nuclear energy, trade, and commerce—was perhaps the 
most influential negative lesson, emboldening the desire of India and Pakistan to achieve their 
own nuclear weapons capability. After having used nuclear weapons in the one and only incident 
in history thus far, the United States led the way in promoting the idea of a ‘nuclear taboo’ or the 
non-use of nuclear weapons, establishing it as a tradition that conveniently reinforced the nuclear 
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order by invoking the ethical, moral, and humanitarian arguments against the use of nuclear 
weapons. These arguments did manage to discourage prospective proliferants, but not without 
exceptions. On the promises made, despite the ‘good faith’ approach enshrined in the NPT to 
work towards nuclear disarmament, the five NWS continued their respective nuclear and missile 
developments over the years until they reached nuclear sufficiency. The negative lesson therein 
echoed lack of commitment and non-seriousness about nuclear disarmament by the P-5. Even 
today, the U.S., Russian, and Chinese nuclear modernization attempts are indicative of a new 
reality in which the nuclear disarmament pillar of the NPT regime might become obsolete in 
coming years because the de jure NWS lack commitment to follow through on nuclear 
disarmament. Last but not least, Israel becoming the closet nuclear proliferant in the 1960s and 
managing to maintain false nuclear ambiguity even today only helps reinforce this organized 
hypocrisy. 
 
These examples allow us to achieve a systemic understanding of the discriminatory nature of the 
nuclear order, which created the divide between the haves and have-nots and was not ideal for 
discouraging nuclear proliferation. And since the system has held on to this discrimination, 
conditions to discourage further nuclear proliferation are not conducive enough to deter future 
proliferants. This first set of learning took place by just observing how NWS behaved in the 
international system and how the system was geared to benefit the few. It shaped the psyche of 
the nuclear outliers that India and Pakistan became post 1970 and shaped their decision to 
acquire nuclear weapons. 
 
Pakistan’s Nuclear Learning 
Specific to Pakistan, the learning took place at several levels and was related to the Indian 
nuclear developments post-1970 and how the international community responded to those 
developments. Pakistan’s nuclear policy is driven by the security dilemma it faces vis-à-vis 
India. In the decade of the 1970s alone, a series of events cemented Pakistan’s thinking about the 
discriminatory nature of the non-proliferation regime. Pakistan proposed the creation of a 
nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in South Asia in September 1972, two years before the 
Indian nuclear test in 1974; however, the proposal didn’t gain traction due to lack of support by 
the P-5, with the exception of China. After the Indian nuclear test in 1974, the UN General 
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Assembly approved Pakistan’s proposal to create a NWFZ in South Asia, but India and Bhutan 
voted against the proposal.3 
 
Like India, which sought positive security assurances against China when the NPT was being 
negotiated in the late 1960s, Pakistan also attempted to get positive security assurances against 
India in the late 1970s, but to no avail. After the Indian nuclear test in May 1974, Pakistan’s 
narrative suggested that it was being persecuted for a crime that India had committed. India had 
conducted its first nuclear explosive test on May 18, 1974 by separating plutonium from the 
spent fuel from its Canadian-supplied nuclear reactor CIRUS (Canada-India-Reactor-United 
States), for which the United States has supplied the heavy water.4 The Indian nuclear test 
(dubbed a peaceful nuclear explosion or PNE) was criticized worldwide for violating the 
integrity of bilateral nuclear agreements with Canada and the United States. After the Indian 
nuclear test, Canada unilaterally terminated its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan on December 
22, 1976. Pakistan objected that Canadian decision was unjust, since Pakistan as party to the 
agreement had not violated any terms of their contract and that it was being punished for ‘India’s 
crime’. Pakistani press reported that “Canada, betrayed by India and publically acknowledging 
its inability to influence her…unaccountably sought to bill all that to Pakistan with interest.”5 
 
Pressure and denial of access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes/civilian nuclear 
energy, e.g., the cancelled Pak-French plutonium reprocessing agreement in 1978, further added 
to the disappointment that was brewing, especially with respect to Pakistan-U.S. relations and the 
overall discriminatory nature of the non-proliferation regime. Additional pressure on Pakistan 
came when nuclear non-proliferation sanctions were invoked against Pakistan to restrain its 
nuclear ambitions. The Symington sanction, a U.S. non-proliferation amendment to the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 passed in 1976, stated that U.S. foreign economic and military assistance 
would be suspended to any country found to be delivering, receiving, transferring, or acquiring 
                                                          
3 For a discussion on Pakistan’s proposal and the politics see Haider Nizamani, The Roots of Rhetoric: Politics of 
Nuclear Weapons in India and Pakistan (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers), 2000. 
4 For a discussion on U.S. role in Indian nuclear test in 1974 see Paul Levanthal’s statement on “CIRUS Reactor’s 
Role in a U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement,” at the Center for Non-proliferation Studies, Washington DC, December 
19, 2005 available at http://www.nci.org/06nci/04/CIRUS%20Reactors%20Role%20in%20a%20US-
India%20Nuclear.htm. 
5 Duane Bratt, The Politics of CANDU Exports (Toronto: Toronto University Press) 2006,148. 
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nuclear enrichment technology.6 Pakistan was placed under the Symington sanctions in April 
1979 after it was discovered that Pakistan was building an enrichment facility in Kahuta. 
Similarly, the Pressler sanction, a Pakistan-specific, non-proliferation legislation passed in 1985, 
was invoked in 1990, when there was evidence that Pakistan possessed a nuclear device, and 
U.S. President George H.W. Bush failed to certify to Congress that Pakistan did not possess a 
nuclear device.7 The lessons learnt by Pakistan through the sanctioning and denial regime were 
negative, with the foremost being that the road to nuclearization goes through the black market. 
But even there, Pakistan’s access to the black market was under the watchful eyes of the United 
States, and Pakistan did nothing that the U.S. government was not aware of at all times with 
respect to ‘proliferation’ and access to nuclear technology through the black market. 
 
Pakistan’s strategy to deal with the altered strategic dynamics in South Asia after the Indian 
nuclear test in 1974 consisted of the following: a) maintain nuclear ambiguity while seeking 
conventional military arms from the United States to modernize its military to counter the Indian 
conventional and nuclear threat; b) seek nuclear guarantees from major powers; c) stay out of the 
NPT while internationalizing the issues of both regional nuclear proliferation and disarmament 
by speaking out against the presence of nuclear weapons in the region; and d) acquire civilian 
nuclear technology from various international suppliers to firstly, meet its energy requirements 
and secondly, to develop its nuclear infrastructure. 
 
South Asian Nuclear Experience and Positive Lessons 
Since 1998, nuclear Pakistan and nuclear India have had several crises that have been managed 
by the active involvement of the United States and several other back channels. They are: Kargil 
1999; the 2001-2002 Twin Peaks Crisis; and the 2008 Mumbai Attacks. The international 
community wants the two countries to learn from the U.S.-Soviet Cold War experience and 
understand that even when deterrence is credible, minimal or not, it is not fail-proof. Pakistani 
and Indian experiences during these crises and nuclear signaling thereafter suggest that there is 
absolutely no space for limited war under the nuclear umbrella. However, both countries believe 
                                                          
6 The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (popularly referred as the Symington 
Amendment); see Section 669, Chapter 3, Part III of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; Public Law 94-329. 
7 Subsec (e), Sec 902 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985; Public Law 99-83 
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that their nuclear experiences and behavior towards each other is uniquely determined by their 
history and geography, which give rise to new sets of analytical variables that are different from 
those used to analyze the U.S.-Soviet dyad. And given that exceptionality, any ‘learning’ about 
nuclear Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), crisis management, nuclear risk reduction, arms 
race stability, or reducing nuclear arsenals to an appropriate size or even reaching eventual zero 
cannot be an ‘external’ process. It can neither be ‘outsourced’ nor ‘imported’. It needs to be an 
internal process. 
 
New Learning from Indo-Pak Bilateral Crises 
In our ‘Nuclear Learning in South Asia’ paper, Debak Das and I propose several lessons that 
both India and Pakistan still need to learn from their bilateral crises. 
 
For lessons from the bilateral crises, we propose the following: 
1. No measures should be taken by either country to destabilize mutual nuclear deterrence. 
2. Nuclear signaling early on in the conflict has the potential of gearing a crisis towards a 
rapid nuclear escalation. 
3. Limited war under the nuclear umbrella is a lethal doctrine, and thus should be 
abandoned. 
4. Bilateral mechanisms of crisis stability should be devised to reduce the reliance on third-
party crisis management. 
5. There should be a continuous process of conventional and nuclear trust and CBMs 
between the two countries. 
6. There should be no ambiguity about nuclear force postures vis-à-vis each other. 
7. The deterrence value of battlefield nuclear weapons is fragile and provocative to say the 
least.8 
 
We further propose CBMs for future risk-reduction between India and Pakistan, as follows: 
1. Adopt CBMs that stress early warning. 
2. Establish a Bilateral Crisis Management Center. 
3. Adopt CBMs on reducing the threat of cross-border nuclear sabotage. 
4. Adopt a common nuclear-strategic lexicon to avoid miscommunication and 
misunderstanding. 
5. Engage academia and experts in strategic debates for policy inputs. 
6. Negotiate an agreement on Conflict Avoidance Measures (CAMs) to ensure steps to 
establish bilateral and multilateral preventive diplomacy. 
7. Come together in a common forum like the Nuclear Security Summit to address common 
concerns related to but not restricted to nuclear and radioactive security. 
8. Promote and establish a bilateral, if not multilateral, No First Use agreement.9 
                                                          
8 Akhtar and Das, Nuclear Learning in South Asia, pp.38 (pdf) 
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Nuclear Stability at Low Numbers: The Uniqueness of the South Asian Challenge 
India and Pakistan truly de-hyphenate on what shapes their nuclear behavior and how they have 
internalized the lessons learned, pre- and post- nuclearization. For India, there have been 
systemic and sub-systemic influences that have shaped its nuclear choices and behavior and 
continue to do so. For Pakistan it has mainly been sub-systemic influences that have shaped its 
nuclear choices and behavior and continue to do so. Since the sources of the influences that 
shape their nuclear behavior are different, each country would require a unique approach if the 
goal is to integrate them into the new nuclear order. And in order for that to happen, the 
international community needs to understand those influences, respect their differences, and 
work towards mitigating the circumstances that continually reinforce their desire to expand their 
nuclear weapons infrastructure. 
 
If you were to ask India and Pakistan, they would say they are already at low numbers and there 
is nuclear stability, with the exception of a crisis here and there. That is, the ‘South Asian 
Challenge’ does not really appear to be a challenge to the two South Asian countries. You add 
China to the mix and it also maintains that its stockpile is not increasing beyond a minimal 
number that it has determined to be sufficient for credible deterrence. Therefore, the challenge 
lies somewhere else and not in South Asia. Why do India and Pakistan believe it is not their 
problem? That eventual zero or disarmament is not their responsibility to share or even their 
burden to bear? The answer is not that difficult. 
 
Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, in his 2009 Foreign Policy article 
‘Apocalypse Soon’, wrote the following, which is still valid and hauntingly accurate today and 
will remain so for future, given the pace of nuclear modernization by the United States and 
Russia: 
 
“What is shocking is that today, more than a decade after the end of the Cold War, the basic US 
nuclear policy is unchanged. Of the 8,000 active or operational nuclear warheads, 2,000 are on 
hair-trigger alert, ready to be launched on 15 minutes’ warning…On any given day, as we go 
about our business, the president is prepared to make a decision within 20 minutes that could 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
9 Ibid, pg. 40 
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launch one of the most devastating weapons in the world… To declare war requires an act of 
congress, but to launch a nuclear holocaust requires 20 minutes’ deliberation by the president 
and his advisors.”10 
 
According to the FAS Nuclear Notebook 2016, the U.S. maintains a stockpile estimated at 4,670 
warheads, of which 1,930 warheads are deployed, 1750 on ballistic missiles and 180 tactical 
bombs at European bases. The warheads that are retired but intact are around 2,340, making it a 
stockpile of 6,970 warheads in total.11 For Russia, as discussed in the FAS Nuclear Notebook 
2016, the estimated stockpile is at 4,500 active nuclear warheads and 2,800 retired warheads, 
making an inventory total of 7,300 warheads.12 Therefore, to India and Pakistan, it is clear where 
the discussion needs to begin. 
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10 Robert S. McNamara, “Apocalypse Soon,” Foreign Policy, October 21, 2009 available at 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/21/apocalypse-soon/. 
11 Data at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2016.1145901. 
12 Data at http://thebulletin.org/2016/may/russian-nuclear-forces-20169394. 
